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Summary: The article researches most important points of Wittgenstein’s ethics. 
Comparative description of Popper’s and Wittgenstein’s theories of ethics is proposed. Non-
linguistic nature of ethics and relations of ethics to language are shown. Complementary 
character of silence of ethical action and biographical aspect of philosophy is demonstrated. 
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Анотація: У статті розглянуто найбільш важливі положення етики Людвіга 
Вітгенштайна. Співставлюються теоретичні підходи Поппера та Вітгенштайна до питань 
етики; показана позамовна природа етики та відношення етики та мови; 
продемонстрований комплементарний характер мовчання як етичної дії та біографічні 
аспекти філософії. 
Ключові слова: біографія, мовні ігри, мовчання, пропозиція, філософські 
проблеми, етика, етичні проблеми. 
Аннотация: Статья рассматривает наиболее важные положения этики Людвига 
Витгенштейна. Сопоставлены теоретические подходы Поппера и Витгенштейна к этике; 
показана внеязыковая природа этики и отношения этики и языка; продемонстрирован 
дополнительный характер молчания как этического действия и биографические аспекты 
философии. 
Ключевые слова: биография, молчание, пропозиция, философские проблемы, 
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25
th
 of October 1945 Dr. Karl Popper from London made a speech before 
Cambridge Moral Science Club with topic «Are There Philosophical Problems?». 
The Chairman of the Club Ludwig Wittgenstein was the man who stated that there 
aren’t any philosophical problems but only language games. Popper thought that 
Wittgenstein was his chief private rival and he was waiting for an opportunity 
when he could clash with him for a long period. Wittgenstein knew too little about 
Popper. 
 «Popper's account can be found in his intellectual autobiography, 
Unended Quest, published in 1974. According to this version of events, Popper put 
forward a series of what he insisted were real philosophical problems. Wittgenstein 
summarily dismissed them all. Popper recalled that Wittgenstein "had been 
nervously playing with the poker," which he used "like a conductor's baton to 
emphasize his assertions," and when a question came up about the status of ethics, 
Wittgenstein challenged him to give an example of a moral rule. "I replied: "Not to 
threaten visiting lecturers with pokers.' Whereupon Wittgenstein, in a rage, threw 
the poker down and stormed out of the room, banging the door behind him"» [5, p. 
8–9]. 
“Wittgenstein’s poker. The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument Between Two 
Great Philosophers” by David Edmonds and John Eidinow is a book based on 
dispute about ethics where one philosopher’s propositions are confronts of the 
propositions of the other. Wittgenstein didn’t slake Popper’s thirst to fight, but he 
gave him an opportunity to think that the lecture was a successful victory. Popper 
suggested to Wittgenstein as the same as other guests of Science Club that 
proposed some philosophical problems (which Wittgenstein had already solved). 
If Wittgenstein had really been (offended) by the problem but not only with 
the speaker’s impudence, he would have behaved in a different way.  
«As for Wittgenstein, if the topic under discussion caught his interest he 
would become utterly engrossed, oblivious to his surroundings. On one occasion, 
when he was walking home with Michael Wolff after an MSC meeting, two 
speeding U.S. Army lorries passed close enough to make Wolffs gown flutter. 
"Those lorries go too fast," he grumbled. Totally unconscious of the near miss, 
Wittgenstein assumed that Wolffs comment was a metaphor about the MSC paper 
and replied, "I can't see what that has to do with the question"» [5, p. 38–39]. 
However the authors of “Wittgenstein’s poker…” supposed that 
Wittgenstein “began to think about a puzzle that had come up in his seminar that 
afternoon: in comics, a balloon with words means "speaking" a cloud with words 
means “thinking”” when he left the Trinity College. 
The matter is Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
In Oxford «Companion to Philosophy» the article Wittgensteinians started 
with the statement «…the evolution of philosophy this century would be as 
unintelligible without his work as would that of twentieth-century art without 
Picasso`s» [1, p. 916]. As Picasso invented new styles of art expression during all 
his life, Wittgenstein became the father of two philosophical schools: logical 
positivism (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and philosophy of ordinary language 
(Blur and Brown Books, Philosophical Investigations, On Certainty, Remarks on 
Colour, Zettel etc.). 
In post-soviet cultural situations Wittgenstein was mixed up with 
Wittgenstein I and usually was referred to “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”: from 
battlefront of WWI to teaching in village schools. Of course this mistake isn’t so 
fatal if we remember that definitely the same situation was before Wittgenstein II’s 
appearing. We have found ourselves in the same condition as Wittgenstein by 
himself: when his philosophy came to logical positivism and ethical side of 
Tractatus kept in the background. 
Roughly speaking TFL has already marked out two Wittgensteins and 
conversion to ordinary language became the third side of his philosophy. In the 
first period we assign two approaches to the language and both of them based on 
thesis that every philosophical problem is a language problem. The first approach 
says that all events in the world are conforming to logic. Logic by-turn is a perfect 
language. The second approach says that “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one 
must be silent”. There is an ethical part and here language is unarmed and poor. 
We know that “in trenches” Wittgenstein solved all philosophical 
problems. He writes on foreword to Tractatus: 
«On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to 
me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all 
essential points, the final solution of the problems. And if I am not mistaken in this 
belief, then the second thing in which the essence of this work consists is that it 
shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved» [3, p. 4]. 
Problematic character of division between logical/ethical propositions was 
defined by wrong reception of 7
th
 thesis (Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one 
must be silent) by Vienna Circle. Proposition on «impossibility of talking» was 
misunderstood as proposition on «unreasonability to talk». 
Wittgenstein writing to Vienna publishers: «The book's point is an ethical 
one. My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not 
written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one» [5, p. 161]. 
Due to this point we have specific value of so-called second part of 
Tractatus, which was outside of positivistic vision and theories of post-soviet 
manuals of philosophy: 
«A few in the Circle — Otto Neurath among them — came to regard 
Wittgenstein as a confidence trickster. Rudolf Carnap was particularly struck by 
the contrast between the Circle's interpretation of Wittgenstein's text and the man 
himself. The Circle consisted of hard-nosed scientists, dismissive of metaphysics, 
moralizing, and spirituality — and they initially believed that such rejection was 
also the message of the Tractatus. And yet here, in the flesh, was this poetry-
reciting semimystic» [5, p. 161]. 
Next three positions are most important for Wittgenstein’s ethics 
understanding. I’ll rely on his “Lecture on ethics” delivered in Cambridge in 1929 
or 1930. 
Proposition 1: 
We can’t make ethical well-formed statements but we must define the 
sense of the word “ethics”. How to make it possible? By several photos we can 
mark out typical features of faces on these images. So we can sort out features of 
ethics by synonymous row of conceptual definitions. Wittgenstein calls it “family 
likeness”. 
«Now instead of saying “Ethics is the enquiry into what is good” I could 
have said Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really 
important, or I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or 
into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living» [3, p. 332]. 
Proposition 2 
Only logical (descriptive) and ethical propositions is exist. The World is 
the constellation of facts. Facts are describable, ethics is not. 
 
«Suppose one of you were an omniscient person and therefore knew all the 
movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive and that he also knew all 
the states of mind of all human being that ever lived, and suppose this man wrote 
all he knew in a big book, then this book would contain the whole description of 
the world; and what I want to say is, that this book would contain nothing that we 
would call an ethical judgement» [3, p. 334]. 
Proposition 3 
Indication to Divine. 
Both  «Tractatus» and «Lecture on Ethics» conclude the chain of theses 
«World is the constellation of facts», «Facts are described by logic» by thesis about 
Ethics placing out of world. Ethics can’t be described through factual sentences. 
There are no logical sentences out of language. Science is a matter of prisoner of a 
linguistic prison. Propositions are a cage. We can call something outside the cage 
as “Ethics” consequently to this: «I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried 
to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language» 
[3, p. 342]. 
Wittgenstein writes about it even in Tractatus before his famous thesis 
seven: 
6.41  The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is 
as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it 
did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must 
lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens 
and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the 
world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world. 
6.42 . So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions 
can express nothing that is higher. 
6.42.1 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. 
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.) 
Or: 
«What is Good is Divine too. That, strangely enough, sums up my ethics» 
[2, p. 26]. 
At last, I’d like to send my reader to biographies of Ludwig because there 
is not any chance to understand his philosophy without understanding of the way 
of his life. To speak about Ethics is the hardest task, but Wittgenstein proposed 
speaking biography instead of a place of ethical silence. His last words were: «Tell 
them it was wonderful life!» 
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